Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question:
1 [<< | >>]
To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is necessary?
(2) Whether it is a science?
(3) Whether it is one or many?
(4) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(5) How it is compared with other sciences?
(6) Whether it is the same as wisdom?
(7) Whether God is its subject-matter?
(8) Whether it is a matter of argument?
(9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes?
(10) Whether the Sacred Scripture
of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses?
Index [<< |
>>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question:
1 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems
that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further
knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason:
"Seek not the things that are too high for thee" (Ecclus. 3:22).
But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical
science. Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science
is superfluous.
Objection 2: Further,
knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be
known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But everything
that is, is treated of in philosophical science---even God Himself;
so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine
science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore, besides
philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge.
On
the contrary, It is written (2
Tim. 3.16): "All Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to
teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice." Now Scripture,
inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has
been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides
philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired
of God.
I answer that, It was necessary
for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God
besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly,
indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses
the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee,
what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee" (Is.
66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct
their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for
the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason
should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards
those truths about God which human reason could have discovered,
it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation;
because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would
only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the
admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which
is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore,
in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly
and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine
truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides
philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred
science learned through revelation.
Reply to Objection
1: Although those things which are beyond man's knowledge
may not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless,
once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by faith.
Hence the sacred text continues, "For many things are shown to
thee above the understanding of man" (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this,
the sacred science consists.
Reply to Objection
2: Sciences are differentiated according to the various
means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer and
the physicist both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth,
for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics
(i.e. abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter
itself. Hence there is no reason why those things which may be
learned from philosophical science, so far as they can be known
by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another science
so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology included
in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is
part of philosophy.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question:
1 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection
1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every
science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine
proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since their
truth is not admitted by all: "For all men have not faith" (2
Thess. 3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.
Objection
2: Further, no science deals with individual facts. But
this sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds
of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine
is not a science.
On the contrary, Augustine
says (De Trin. xiv, 1) "to this science alone belongs that whereby
saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected and strengthened."
But this can be said of no science except sacred doctrine. Therefore
sacred doctrine is a science.
I answer that, Sacred
doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two
kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle
known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic
and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles
known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective
proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from
principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine
is a science because it proceeds from principles established by
the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and
the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the
principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is
established on principles revealed by God.
Reply
to Objection 1: The principles of any science are either
in themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of
a higher science; and such, as we have said, are the principles
of sacred doctrine.
Reply to Objection 2: Individual
facts are treated of in sacred doctrine, not because it is concerned with
them principally, but they are introduced rather both as examples
to be followed in our lives (as in moral sciences) and in order
to establish the authority of those men through whom the divine
revelation, on which this sacred scripture or doctrine is based,
has come down to us.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question:
1 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection
1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for
according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) "that science is one which
treats only of one class of subjects." But the creator and the
creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot
be grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore sacred
doctrine is not one science.
Objection 2: Further,
in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal creatures and
human morality. But these belong to separate philosophical sciences.
Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one science.
On
the contrary, Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science:
"Wisdom gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of holy things" (Wis.
10:10).
I answer that, Sacred doctrine
is one science. The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged
by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards
the precise formality under which it is an object. For example,
man, ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being colored;
and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore, because Sacred
Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being
divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses
the one precise formality of the object of this science; and therefore
is included under sacred doctrine as under one science.
Reply
to Objection 1: Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and
creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only
so far as they are referable to God as their beginning or end.
Hence the unity of this science is not impaired.
Reply
to Objection 2: Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits
from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher
faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit
regards the object in its more universal formality, as the object
of the "common sense" is whatever affects the senses, including,
therefore, whatever is visible or audible. Hence the "common sense,"
although one faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses.
Similarly, objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical
sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science
under one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation.
So that in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp
of the divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.
Index [<< |
>>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question:
1 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection
1: It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science;
for a practical science is that which ends in action according
to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained
to action: "Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only" (James
1:22). Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.
Objection
2: Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and
the New Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical
science. Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.
On
the contrary, Every practical science is concerned with
human operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts,
and architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly
concerned with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore
it is not a practical but a speculative science.
I
answer that, Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things
which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers
in each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through
divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences
one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine
includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both
Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical
because it is more concerned with divine things than with human
acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man
is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists
eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.
Index [<< |
>>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question:
1 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems
that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences; for the
nobility of a science depends on the certitude it establishes.
But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be doubted, seem
to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its principles---namely,
articles of faith---can be doubted. Therefore other sciences seem
to be nobler.
Objection 2: Further, it
is the sign of a lower science to depend upon a higher; as music
depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in a sense depend
upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his Epistle
to Magnus, that "the ancient doctors so enriched their books with
the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou knowest not
what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or their scriptural
learning." Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences.
On
the contrary, Other sciences are called the handmaidens
of this one: "Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower" (Prov.
9:3).
I answer that, Since this science
is partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all others
speculative and practical. Now one speculative science is said
to be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater certitude,
or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter. In both
these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences;
in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their
certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err;
whereas this derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge,
which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter
because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their
sublimity transcend human reason; while other sciences consider
only those things which are within reason's grasp. Of the practical
sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained to a further purpose,
as political science is nobler than military science; for the good
of the army is directed to the good of the State. But the purpose of
this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to
which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science
are directed. Hence it is clear that from every standpoint, it
is nobler than other sciences.
Reply to Objection
1: It may well happen that what is in itself the more certain
may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness of our
intelligence, "which is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature;
as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun" (Metaph. ii, lect.
i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles of
faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but to
the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest knowledge
that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than
the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said
in de Animalibus xi.
Reply to Objection 2: This
science can in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences,
not as though it stood in need of them, but only in order to make
its teaching clearer. For it accepts its principles not from other
sciences, but immediately from God, by revelation. Therefore it
does not depend upon other sciences as upon the higher, but makes
use of them as of the lesser, and as handmaidens: even so the master
sciences make use of the sciences that supply their materials,
as political of military science. That it thus uses them is not
due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our
intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known through
natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that
which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this science.
Index [<< |
>>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question:
1 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection
1: It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom.
For no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name
of wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed
(Metaph. i). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore
this science is not wisdom.
Objection 2: Further,
it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles of other sciences.
Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is clear in Ethic.
vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences.
Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.
Objection
3: Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas
wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered
among the gifts of the Holy Spirit ("Is.
11:2). Therefore this doctrine is not the same as wisdom.
On
the contrary, It is written (Dt.
4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of
nations."
I answer that, This doctrine
is wisdom above all human wisdom; not merely in any one order,
but absolutely. For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange
and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the
light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one
order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus in
the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called
wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who
trim the wood and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect,
I have laid the foundation" ("1
Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life, the prudent
man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a fitting
end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Prov.
10: 23). Therefore he who considers absolutely the highest
cause of the whole universe, namely God, is most of all called
wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things,
as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But sacred doctrine essentially
treats of God viewed as the highest cause---not only so far as
He can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew Him---"That
which is known of God is manifest in them" (Rm.
1.19)---but also as far as He is known to Himself alone and
revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called
wisdom.
Reply to Objection 1: Sacred doctrine
derives its principles not from any human knowledge, but from the
divine knowledge, through which, as through the highest wisdom,
all our knowledge is set in order.
Reply to Objection
2: The principles of other sciences either are evident
and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through some
other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes through
revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no
concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to
judge of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to
any truth of this science must be condemned as false: "Destroying
counsels and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge
of God" (2
Cor. 10:4,5).
Reply to Objection 3: Since
judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces
a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by inclination, as
whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns
that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it is the
virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human
acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral
science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though
he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things
belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost: "The spiritual man judgeth all things" (1
Cor. 2:15). And Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Hierotheus
is taught not by mere learning, but by experience of divine things."
The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine which is
acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.
Index [<< |
>>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question:
1 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection
1: It seems that God is not the object of this science.
For in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed.
But this science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. i, iv): "It is impossible to define the essence
of God." Therefore God is not the object of this science.
Objection
2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science
must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy
Writ we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning
many other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore
God is not the object of this science.
On the
contrary, The object of the science is that of which it
principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly
about God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore
God is the object of this science.
I answer that, God
is the object of this science. The relation between a science and
its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its
object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit
is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred
to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the
faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things
are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all things
are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are
God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and
end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this
science. This is clear also from the principles of this science, namely,
the articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the
principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the
whole science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however,
looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect
under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science
to be something other than God---that is, either things and signs;
or the works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and
members. Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science,
but so far as they have reference to God.
Reply
to Objection 1: Although we cannot know in what consists
the essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of
His effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition,
in regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning
God; even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something
about a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of
a definition of the cause.
Reply to Objection
2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this sacred
science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or
accidents but as in some way related to Him.
Index [<< |
>>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question:
1 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection
1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For
Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought."
But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things
are written that you may believe" (Jn.
20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.
Objection
2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument
is either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority,
it seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority
is the weakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is
unbefitting its end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith
has no merit in those things of which human reason brings its own
experience." Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.
On
the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace
that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may
be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers"
(Titus 1:9).
I
answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of
their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate
other truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue
in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but
from them it goes on to prove something else; as the Apostle from
the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection
(1
Cor. 15). However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to
the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither
prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but
leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz.
metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if
only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede
nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his
objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above
itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if
the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through
divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in
Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of faith, we
can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation,
there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by
reasoning, but only of answering his objections---if he has any---against
faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary
of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments
brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties
that can be answered.
Reply to Objection 1: Although
arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be received
on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine argues from articles of faith
to other truths.
Reply to Objection 2: This
doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch
as its principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to
believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been
made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine,
for although the argument from authority based on human reason
is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine
revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even
of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit
of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things
that are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does
not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister
to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity.
Hence the Apostle says: "Bringing into captivity every understanding
unto the obedience of Christ" (2
Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority
of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know
the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus:
"As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His offspring"
(Acts
17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities
as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of
the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the
authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly
be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation
made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books,
and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other
doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only
those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned
to hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred
in any way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not
to deem everything in their works to be true, merely on account
of their having so thought and written, whatever may have been
their holiness and learning."
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question:
1 [<< | >>]
Article: 9 [<< | >>]
Objection
1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors.
For that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit
this science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed
by the aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry,
the least of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that
this science should make use of such similitudes.
Objection
2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth
clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: "They
that explain me shall have life everlasting" (Ecclus. 24:31). But
by such similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward
divine truths by likening them to corporeal things does not befit
this science.
Objection 3: Further, the
higher creatures are, the nearer they approach to the divine likeness.
If therefore any creature be taken to represent God, this representation
ought chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures, and not from
the lower; yet this is often found in Scriptures.
On
the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied
visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets."
But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use metaphors.
Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.
I
answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine
and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things.
For God provides for everything according to the capacity of its
nature. Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths
through sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates
from sense. Hence in Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly
taught under the likeness of material things. This is what Dionysius
says (Coel. Hier. i): "We cannot be enlightened by the divine rays
except they be hidden within the covering of many sacred veils."
It is also befitting Holy Writ, which is proposed to all without
distinction of persons---"To the wise and to the unwise I am a
debtor" (Rm.
1:14)---that spiritual truths be expounded by means of figures
taken from corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple
who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able
to understand it.
Reply to Objection 1: Poetry
makes use of metaphors to produce a representation, for it is natural
to man to be pleased with representations. But sacred doctrine
makes use of metaphors as both necessary and useful.
Reply
to Objection 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished
by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not
allow the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made,
to rest in the metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths;
and through those to whom the revelation has been made others also
may receive instruction in these matters. Hence those things that
are taught metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts
are taught more openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is
useful for the exercise of thoughtful minds and as a defense against
the ridicule of the impious, according to the words "Give not that
which is holy to dogs" (Mt.
7:6).
Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius
says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more fitting that divine truths should
be expounded under the figure of less noble than of nobler bodies,
and this for three reasons. Firstly, because thereby men's minds
are the better preserved from error. For then it is clear that
these things are not literal descriptions of divine truths, which
might have been open to doubt had they been expressed under the
figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who could think of
nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is more befitting
the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what He is
not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes drawn
from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate
that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him. Thirdly,
because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy.
Index [<< |
>>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question:
1 [<< | >>]
Article: 10 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that
in Holy Writ a word cannot have several senses, historical or literal,
allegorical, tropological or moral, and anagogical. For many different
senses in one text produce confusion and deception and destroy
all force of argument. Hence no argument, but only fallacies, can
be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But Holy Writ ought
to be able to state the truth without any fallacy. Therefore in
it there cannot be several senses to a word.
Objection
2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that "the
Old Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology,
analogy and allegory." Now these four seem altogether different
from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore
it does not seem fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ
according to the four different senses mentioned above.
Objection
3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical,
which is not one of these four.
On the contrary, Gregory
says (Moral. xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner of its speech transcends
every science, because in one and the same sentence, while it describes
a fact, it reveals a mystery."
I answer that, The
author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His
meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things
themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are signified
by words, this science has the property, that the things signified
by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore that
first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the
first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby
things signified by words have themselves also a signification
is called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and
presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division.
For as the Apostle says (Heb.
10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and Dionysius
says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a figure of future
glory." Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a
type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of
the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical
sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things
which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is
the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal
glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is
that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ
is God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect,
it is not unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even
according to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have
several senses.
Reply to Objection 1: The
multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any
other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied
because one word signifies several things, but because the things
signified by the words can be themselves types of other things.
Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are
founded on one---the literal---from which alone can any argument
be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as Augustine
says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes
on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained
under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by
the Scripture in its literal sense.
Reply to Objection
2: These three---history, etiology, analogy---are grouped
under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine
expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it is called
etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the
reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives---namely, on
account of the hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever
the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the
truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the
three spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4
Prolog.) includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying
down three senses only---the historical, the allegorical, and the
tropological.
Reply to Objection 3: The
parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by words things
are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself,
but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks
of God's arm, the literal sense is not that God has such a member,
but only what is signified by this member, namely operative power.
Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal
sense of Holy Writ.